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Governments vs States: decoding dual
governance in the developing world
ERSEL AYDINLI
ABSTRACT This article begins by questioning the transferability of Western
conceptualisations of the ‘state’ to the developing world, particularly to those
areas in which security concerns are extreme. It proposes that the complicated
relationship between security and political liberalisation produces a reform–
security dilemma, which in turn may result in dual-governance structures
consisting of an autonomous ‘state’ bureaucracy and a relatively newer, political
‘government’. The dynamics of such a duality are explored through a
longitudinal comparison of two critical cases: Iran and Turkey. Both cases
reveal evidence of the ‘state’ and ‘government’ as distinct bodies, emerging over
time in response to conflicting pressures for security and liberalisation. While
the Iranian case remains entrenched in a static duality with an advantaged
‘state’, the Turkish case provides optimism that, under certain conditions, an
eventual subordination of the state to the political government can take place.
States and governments have traditionally been conceptualised as more or
less inseparable parts of a single whole, or, at least, as one being an integral
part of the other. While scholars approach the concept of states in different
ways,1 a common underlying starting point is to combine or only minimally
distinguish between the concepts of ‘state’ and ‘government’. A strong
example of such a conceptual overlap is the neo-realist view of the state as
agent, in which statehood includes the governing individuals and institutions
and their activities. A somewhat greater distinction is made by those who
assign to the ‘state’ the broader meaning of the overall structure of political
authority, while attributing actual agency to the ‘governmental agents’ that
are ‘embedded’ in that state structure.2 The difference between states and
governments in the latter perspective has been summarised as one in which
reference to governments implies a focus on the agents of governance, and
reference to states implies a focus on the overall structure of governance.3
Even such a teasing apart of the two concepts still leaves us with the
understanding that the two are inextricably connected, if not just two ways of
looking at the same overall political authority.
In some areas of the non-Western world, however, such overlapping
conceptualisations of the ‘state as government’4, or of the state as
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bureaucratic structure including government actors, may be inadequate. In
these countries ‘state’ and ‘government’ may not only represent distinct
aspects of a single political authority, but two separate actors in national
governance. This seems to occur when an existing state tradition precedes the
introduction of more democratic ‘government’ actors and practices. Since a
subordination of the existing ‘state’ establishment to a democratic ‘govern-
ment’ often takes considerable time to consolidate, there may emerge a dual
structure, in which the state appears (in varying degrees) as distinct and
autonomous from the government. Under certain conditions this autono-
mous realm may develop into a fully functioning institutionalised ‘inner
state’ within the larger and more visible overall political governance
structure.
Following the path of scholarship that questions the transferability of
certain Western conceptualisations (eg assumptions about the Weberian
state) to non-Western contexts,5 I explore in this article the dynamics and
processes of such dual governance structures. First, I provide a conceptual
discussion of the underlying sources of such duality, and then describe the
process by which duality might emerge. This process is then explored in
greater detail by comparing two critical cases of modern states which,
arguably, have varying degrees of dual state structures—Turkey and Iran.
Conceptualising the duality
The duality of ‘state’ and ‘government’ described here corresponds roughly
to the kind of governance structure referred to by various works on limited
democracies,6 as we see an unelected and often authoritarian state esta-
blishment, rather than transforming into a democratic ‘government’, instead
dividing. The state establishment—based on, for example, a religious,
aristocratic or military elite—adopts a lower visibility role, but maintains
a powerful, underground existence. In other words, it becomes an inner
state, shadowing the apparent or visible state constituted by the elected
government.
Where exactly is this duality stemming from? In the traditional state-
centric international system, a primary occupation has been with security.
In order to curb security threats, the national forces of a state are kept
centralised—although of course the degree to which this is true varies
according to the acuteness of the threat. In order to achieve centralised and
thus maximised power, a ruling elite must not only keep security issues and
rhetoric prominent on the public agenda, but it must also seek to enhance the
existing institutionalisation of the security establishment. Unchecked, such a
securitisation process may lead to the creation of security-oriented nation
states (see Figure 1).
The other end of the scale shows what occurs in an era of globalisation:7 a
multicentric world, in which resources, ideas, and individuals are mobilised,
and new actors are empowered. These new actors produce demands for a
sharing of national power and a consequent pressure for decentralisation.


































‘desecuritisation’, a term not implying an automatic minimising of security
issues, but a lowering of the primary status of security over all else, and a
reconsidering of security as one of several major needs to be satisfied by
national governance. Achieving this involves increasing the transparency of
and civilian control over the determining of threats and the implementing of
national security policies. States that seem to be successfully managing this
process can be identified as globalised states, such as those of Western
Europe and North America.
Many states seem to fall somewhere in between these two worlds and are
thus forced to balance contradicting patterns of power, possibly leading to a
bifurcation of the state structure and, in the extreme, to a torn state, in which
we are likely to find a dual understanding of ‘state’ and ‘government’. The
contradiction emerges for various reasons. First, a need for change towards a
more democratic form of state–society relations now appears generally
inevitable and unavoidable. Second, the capacity of security apparatuses to
use external threat calculations for domestic securitisation has shrunk as
large security apparatuses seem to have lost their definitive mission, and both
their own societies and Western liberal democracies look unfavourably on
large governance roles for security apparatuses. The strong state, therefore, is
feeling not only systematic pressure from the external and internal
environment to downsize and share some of its power, but is also facing a
society that is more actively demanding a share from the centralised power
structure.
What does a centralised state structure do to respond to such power
demands? Ideally it would gradually adapt to a decentralised power
structure, perhaps taking on a supervisory role in the transition process.
However, most developing world state-security apparatuses are not practised
in adapting because of their inherent tendency to overreact to frightening
FIGURE 1. Conceptualising torn states.

































situations of instability. Rather than decentralise and downsize, the strong
state structure tries to further maximise and centralise the power configura-
tion at the national level. It is difficult to find an example of an old-world
state structure initially ready for such rapid adaptation and transformation.
This is especially true because this new threat demands an immediate
securing of the conflictive transformation process in order to avoid
dangerous domestic instability. There is not sufficient time, therefore, for
the nation-state as a whole to produce a new, sophisticated functioning
power structure to meet this new security dilemma.
Thus, security vs reform becomes the primary impasse faced by the
national governance structure. The state is pressured by power diffusion
dynamics that can not be dismissed, yet there remains the need to preserve, if
not maximise its power at a time of (over)perceived insecurities. The question
remains: how does such duality build up and evolve over time? The following
sections of this article explore the reform/security dilemma in detail in the
Turkish and Iranian cases. By highlighting key stages in the clash between
pressures for security and political globalisation, both accounts attempt to
reveal how a duality in governance emerged, how it has developed over time,
and what it implies for the future of such dual state structures.
The Turkish case
Origins of a security–reform pendulum
In the Turkish case the roots of a clash between reform and security go back
to the strategic choice first made by the Ottoman elite in the 19th century to
commit the country to modernisation. Adaptation of this national policy
became the second major force—next to the traditional one of guaranteeing
territorial security—of the Turkish political modus vivendi. There were three
early characteristics of interaction between these two forces. First, with the
Ottoman Empire in a state of territorial contraction, the elite who were in
favour of liberal reforms justified their liberalisation agenda by claiming it
would better protect the state from various security threats. Security was thus
seen as the end, while modernisation was the means. Second, there was a fear
among the elite of uncontrolled devolution of power. This security-based
cautiousness towards liberalisation was often connected to a concern that
political reform would empower ordinary citizens, of whom the elite held an
inherent mistrust. Third, the very ruling elite that assumed the mission of
promoting liberalising reforms was, ironically, the same group responsible
for protecting the country’s national security. When the two elements
clashed, the elite’s role as the state’s professional security guardian prevailed,
spelling at least a temporary end to liberalisation. These three characteristics
were the starting points in the emergence of a structural pendulum between
security and liberalisation. For the most part the security of the state enjoyed
a clear primacy over the liberalisation side of the pendulum, resulting in a



































The relatively peaceful mid-1920s saw an increasing push among some in
the ruling elite for further liberalisation, most notably two attempts to
introduce multiparty politics. In the face of internal security issues, however,
such as Kurdish rebellions in the east and the rise of violent opposition to the
secular reforms, the more security-minded elite opposed the efforts, arguing
that excessive democratic reforms would endanger the regime and the very
state itself. Throughout the subsequent securitisation process, the attempts
failed. If society was not yet ready to be trusted with democracy, desires for
world-standard democratic values would have to be postponed in the name
of protecting regime insecurity.
From pendulum to bifurcation: a grand compromise
Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s the security of the regime and state
held primacy in the continuing pendulum between security and liberalisation.
At the end of World War II, however, the Turkish state elite opted once
again for multiparty politics. In an effort to establish a deeper integration
with the West and therefore a greater sense of security, the state elite realised
that a fuller embracing of Western political values and identities would be
required. By emphasising democracy, the Turkish elite could satisfy the urge
to become a part of the ‘safe’ West, but also help to speed up and secure its
own modernisation project. The result was the establishment in 1946 of the
Democratic Party (DP).
Subsequent fear of the Democratic Party’s goal to change the unbalanced
power situation between itself and the rest of the political system, then a kind
of embedded body of the state and the single party elite, led to the 1960
military coup. What followed would have long-term implications for the
maintenance of an ‘optimal’ balance between reform and security. In the
wake of the 1960 coup, two main positions emerged among the military on
how the nation should be administered: that of the ‘gradualists’, who
preferred a quick return to political rule, albeit under a serious level of
control by the statist elite and the army; and that of the ‘absolutists’,
generally the younger officer class, who felt that the army should stay in
power in order to speed up social and political transformations in the
country. Interestingly, neither the absolutists nor the gradualists were against
further political transformation, but they differed over how quickly that
transformation would be managed. Ultimately, the absolutists’ ideas were
threatening to both the gradualist military leadership and, obviously, the
political leaders, and served to force the rest of the politico-military actors to
come together in a consensus.
Two executions, two syndromes
With the signing of a compromise protocol in which the politicians agreed to
support the presidency of the former coup leader, a kind of power sharing
among the gradualist state elite was established. Multiparty politics would be
allowed to continue, but security demands would permit the imposition of

































certain restrictions on the political realm. Lack of obedience to this
compromise by the political elite was virtually unthinkable. The vivid image
of the hanged DP leaders, including the former prime minister, Adnan
Menderes, served as a haunting reminder—a kind of Menderes Syndrome—
for what could occur if people and their actions were construed as risky, and
thus served as ammunition for the absolutist elements inside the military to
gain strength. These absolutist radical elements within the military then
received a lesson of their own when, in 1962, a second coup attempt by
absolutist forces was quashed, and its leaders, Talat Aydemir and Fethi
Gürcan were hanged. The resulting Aydemir Syndrome would help maintain
the hierarchical unity of the military and thus reduce the fear of coup threats
by renegade military elements. Together, the two syndromes constituted the
boundaries of the Turkish state’s power structure.
The compromise also marked the next stage in the progression from
pendulum to an outright bifurcation in the state system. With security
demands providing the legitimisation for statist elements, and liberalising
demands supporting the maintenance of a multiparty system, the need to find
a manageable way to govern under these simultaneous pressures resulted in
a compromise between two realms—a ‘hard’ realm of security-minded
elements and a political ‘soft’ realm. The compromise also signalled an
acceptance of the idea that the democratic transformation could only be
effectively and safely controlled by allowing the creation and consolidation of
untouchable power centres, in other words, by a strong, autonomous inner
state led by the Turkish military.
Consolidation and institutionalization of reform security
Over the next two decades, with the overall insecurity of the Cold War,
internal clashes between the left and right, secularists and Islamists, and
an increasingly violent Kurdish separatist movement in the southeast, the
autonomy of the hard realm became increasingly institutionalised, from the
passing of laws giving the military powers over its own personnel, education
and financial resources, to the establishing of distinct military and civilian
courts, and the introduction and expansion of the National Security Council
(NSC). The 1982 Constitution served to consolidate many of these security-
based changes, and marked the peak period in the evolution of an established
bifurcation in the Turkish state structure, in which the inner state, while
maintaining some interaction with the government or ‘apparent’ state (most
dramatically through the platform of the NSC) was now virtually autonomous
from government oversight and control.
The dual state structure reflected the Turkish national need to secure
a gradual reform process from the risks of liberalisation. So long as the
security demands—eg the Cold War, conflict with Greece and Iran, the
Cyprus issue, and domestic struggles with Kurdish separatists and
Islamists—clearly seemed to outweigh those for the ideologically appealing




































Early years and the constitutional government
Despite obvious stark contrasts between Iran and Turkey, similarities can be
found, such as their not having been colonised, their being remnants of two
large empires, and their having long experience with nationhood.8 A
similarity can even be seen in terms of their engagement with political
liberalisation—certainly in the sense of its longevity, and to some extent in
terms of how it has occurred as part of a pendulum, swinging between
attempts at reform and subsequent returns to autocratic rule.
Iran’s first experimentations with some liberalising reforms began in the
mid-19th century, when Prime Minister Taqi Khan implemented political
reforms to curb nepotism and corruption, and to reduce the power of the
Shah’s mother. Although his efforts did somewhat improve efficiency, Taqi
Khan’s increasing power was also seen as threatening by the Shah, who had
the prime minister assassinated. Reform efforts were then kept well stifled
by the extreme autocratic ruling style of Shah Naser al-Din in the second half
of the 1800s.
The first truly significant period of Iranian liberalism came about with the
Constitutional Revolution of 1906, when reformist groups, led by an unusual
alliance of the traditional middle class bazaaris (merchants) and the clergy,9
forced the Shah to accept their demands for a constitution limiting the Shah’s
powers and a parliament to conduct daily affairs. The experiment with
constitutional monarchy was, however, fairly short-lived. Following Muzaffar
al-Din’s death in early 1907, Muhammed Ali Shah strongly resisted efforts to
further restrict his powers, in particular, legislation reducing his control over
the army and budget. Playing on the inherent divisions between the religious
and secular members of parliament, the Shah was able to keep the two
struggling against each other, and maintain his own hold on power. His
replacing—without parliamentary approval—of the liberal prime minister
with an arch-conservative, Amin al-Soltan Atabak-I Azam, made it clear that
the Shah was not going to play along with the idea of reigning within the
confines of a constitutional monarchy, and was set upon a return to full rule.
Interference by international forces further complicated the constitution-
alists’ efforts at managing the country’s affairs. Although they did not
necessarily directly support the Shah, the two most involved international
powers, Russia and Great Britain, did find that some results of constitutional
rule in Iran, such as the growing strength and independence of regions in
northern Iran and their potential to spread radical ideas beyond Iran’s
borders, were not necessarily in the two great powers’ best interests. Rather
than continue in their conflictive efforts to gain complete influence over Iran,
Russia and Great Britain agreed in 1907 to divide the country into two
spheres of influence, with Russia taking the north, and Britain the south.
Over the next few tumultuous years, factionalism in Iran between ethnic and
linguistic groups, religious and secular forces, and reformists and non-
reformists, combined with the meddling of the international powers, crippled
the workings of the constitutional government. The constitutional era ended

































in 1911, when the parliament failed to agree to an ultimatum delivered by the
Russians regarding the engaging of foreign advisors, and was shut down
by the prime minister and regent.10
Similar in some ways to Turkish experiences with securitisation as a means
of unifying various groups against overly rapid opening up, the experience of
the Constitutional government, and its failure to overcome internal divisions
or to secure the country against outside influence, combined with the period
of chaos and disruption that followed its demise, no doubt played a
significant role in preparing many people in Iran to be more accepting of a
strong dictatorial figure to run the country. Such a figure emerged in Reza
Khan.
Reza Khan
Left to the control of Great Britain and a young, incompetent Shah during
the years of World War I, Iran was primed and ready for Reza Khan, who
seized power in 1923 and was crowned Shah in 1925. Although often
compared with Ataturk because of his military background and his
programme of imposed rapid modernisation and Westernisation, Reza Shah
differed from his contemporary in crucial ways. Key among these was his
standing domestically. While Ataturk brought Turkey together under the
mantle of having saved the nation from partition, Reza Shah unified Iran
through violent repression of his competitors, and thus lacked the other’s
legitimacy. What they both went on to do with their power also differed
dramatically, with Ataturk striving to install and rule according to a system
of laws, and Reza Shah maintaining his use of arbitrary powers to rule as a
dictator. Reza Shah’s 16-year reign came to end in 1941 when, having wooed
the Germans as a potential ally against the USSR, the complexities of World
War II led to the reinvasion of Iran by the British and Russians, and Reza’s
forced abdication.
The transitional period
The years 1941 to 1953 were marked by turmoil but also by relative political
pluralism, as indicated by the declaring of autonomous provincial govern-
ments, the emergence of multiple political parties and workers’ unions, a
revitalisation of the press, and the election of Prime Minister Mosaddeq.11
Mosaddeq sought to install a strong centralised regime, but one that would
ensure free elections and basic freedoms of thought and action. Unfortu-
nately, as before, factionalism between different classes, religious and secular
groups, communists and non-communists, ran deep. As Mosaddeq lost
control of his supporting groups in the National Front coalition, he became
increasingly autocratic in his rule, ultimately closing down the majlis,
declaring that the will of the people was enough for him to rule by. In a
paralleling of securitised speech often applied in the Turkish case,
Mosaddeq’s moves of ‘‘appeal[ing] to the masses’’ were viewed as ‘‘leading


































stronger, less democratic rule would avert such a risk. Ultimately the
combined forces of internal fragmentation and instability (in large part a
result of the unresolved oil crisis13) and external intervention, this time in the
form of a CIA and British intelligence-sponsored coup attempt, brought the
demise of the elected government, and the installing of a military dictatorship
under Mohammad Reza Shah.
Mohammad Reza Shah
The next era of the Iranian pendulum between relative political freedom and
autocratic rule saw the increasingly militarised and repressive years of the late
1950s, when the officially sponsored Nationalist and Peoples’ parties
provided a façade of democracy, but the founding of the Shah’s secret
police (SAVAK) and the limiting or destruction of trade unions, student
organisations, political parties and associations, and the parliament, were
evidence of a consolidation of the Shah’s power—if not on paper, at least in
practice.
A brief reform period was initiated in 1960 at the insistence of the
Americans,14 who feared that lack of development would bring about more
Third World revolutions. The newly installed prime minister, Ali Amini,
favoured political reforms, and by relying on authoritarian measures of his
own (such as dissolving the majlis and ruling by decree) he did succeed in
exiling the head of SAVAK, launching an anti-corruption campaign in the
justice ministry, and an ambitious land reform programme to bring greater
ownership to the peasants. Although Amini’s government fell in just over a
year, the Shah then incorporated at least some of the government’s reforms
into what he would call his ‘White Revolution’. Primary changes of this
‘revolution’ were some continued elements of the land reform efforts, and the
establishment of a programme to spread literacy and health care throughout
the country. Such social and economic reforms were not accompanied by
political liberalisation, however,15 but rather by a crackdown on political
opposition, including press closures and the exiling, imprisonment or killing
of anti-regime figures. Indeed, the following decade would be much less one
of opening up than one of further consolidation of the Shah’s powers.
From 1963 to 1973 the Shah bolstered his position through careful
manipulation of the country’s finances. He increased spending on the military
and SAVAK, allowing for more effective repression of his opponents, and
he purchased support directly by building up foundations and securing
the livelihoods of the middle and upper classes—thus ensuring various
constituents’ loyalty to him. Such practices were not only inadequate for a
population desiring more fundamental freedoms, they also became less
feasible as the country’s economic troubles grew throughout the 1970s.16
In an effort to save his regime—and arguably in response yet again
to pressure from a newly elected administration in Washington17—the Shah
launched a new programme of political liberalisation in 1977. While he did
use this opportunity to free some political prisoners and to allow some voices
of dissent to be heard, as in the early 1960s, he failed to make any substantive

































changes in the political system—eg refusing to allow alternative political
parties to emerge. Such limited measures were met with tremendous
suspicion, mass societal discontent—from the bazaaris, to the urban poor,
to the new lower-middle class and, of course, to the clergy—and eventually,
sufficient pressure on the Shah to force him to appoint a premier and leave
the country.
The Islamic Revolution
In a radical example of regime change, the 1979 revolution was itself an
attempt to break away from the extreme authoritarianism that had developed
in Iran under the Shah. Described as having had a ‘democratic veneer’ and as
being a possible ‘harbinger of the struggle to reconcile democracy and Islam
in the Middle East’, the revolution did initially bring together different
groups in an effort to gain a greater say in controlling their lives.18 Of course,
as is the risk particularly in revolutionary regime changes, the most organised
segments in a context of chaos, in this case the ultra-conservative clergy, were
able to take control of the momentum and introduce their own kind of
authoritarianism. With much having been written on the Khomenei years, or
the ‘First Republic’19 of the revolution, it is important to note here that the
decade marked a rapid return to autocratic rule after the first couple of years
of political plurality. By 1984 Iran was essentially back to being a one-party
state, and human rights and democracy fell victim to the new regime’s desire
not only to consolidate its tentative domestic grip on power but also to cope
with the external demands of the war with Iraq, economic sanctions, and
falling oil prices.
When Hashemi Rafsanjani became president after the 1989 death of
Ayatollah Khomenei, he introduced some liberalising measures—an era of
‘reconstruction’—primarily economic reforms, the opening of some diplo-
matic ties with the West, and the loosening of certain social restrictions.
While these reforms failed to address any significant political issues, they did
all serve to make the outside world again accessible to Iranians, via satellite
dishes, computers, videos and textbooks—a point that gains importance
when we consider the unavoidable demand for reform, and the subsequent
security dilemma facing the regime. A significant part of the changes was the
dynamism experienced by the press during the first two years of Rafsanjani’s
presidency in particular. Granted, many of the various reform-minded
journals and newspapers launched in the 1990s were closed or threatened
with closure,20 but they can still be seen as having prepared the groundwork
for gradual moves towards even greater liberalisation.21 The most dramatic
example of this came about in what has come to be called the ‘Iranian Spring’
of May 1997, when fair elections led to the victory of the reformist President,
Mohammed Khatami, and later the elections of 2000, when nearly 75 per cent
of those elected to the parliament were reformist-minded candidates.
Predictably perhaps, the pendulum swung back strongly after this
liberalising period, with a crackdown on reformists that included the


































elections and all but eight of the more than 1000 candidates for the 2005
presidential elections. The crackdown also included repressive measures
against anti-regime demonstrators. All of this, not to mention the subsequent
election and rule of President Ahmadinejad, has left most current Western
analyses of Iranian domestic politics fairly pessimistic. The most critical
observers have seen these moves as evidence that the Iranian regime is unified
and tyrannical,22 others have focused on the consolidation of the
conservative leadership,23 and that leadership’s rejection of reform.24 Still
others blame the reformists for having ‘lost steam’.25 Rather than assume the
death of reform in Iran, however, it is important to consider the current
phase in Iranian politics in light of the previous century of political process,
and therefore to try and understand who the ‘conservatives’ and ‘reformists’
are.
Delineating the realms
The oft-noted divide in the Iranian state is most generally described as
existing between ‘reformists,’ corresponding to the ‘soft realm’, and the
‘traditional right’ or ‘conservatives’ of a ‘hard realm’.26 As was seen in the
Turkish case, these two broad realms are often differentiated by their being
made up of accountable (with the soft realm being accountable to the public)
and unaccountable (hard realm) power sources. Given the degree of
institutionalisation of the entities of these two realms, it is reasonable to
characterise those unaccountable sources of power as constituting Iran’s
‘inner state’ and the accountable ones as an ‘apparent state’.
The strongest power authority in the Iranian political system, representing
the core of the inner state, is the ruling jurisprudent or Supreme Leader (vali-
ye faqih). Also within the inner state is the Council of Guardians (Shoray-e
Negahban), which determines whether parliamentary laws are compatible
with Islamic law and thus has effective veto power over all legislation, and the
Council of Experts (Shoray-e Khebregan), which is responsible for choosing
the Supreme Leader from among its ranks. The inner state also includes parts
of the judiciary that are independent from executive power and are under the
Supreme Leader’s control, and certain key parts of the military and the
intelligence structure, such as the protection institution (heraset makami),
which maintains intelligence bureaus throughout the government to ensure
that government activity remains in line with Islamist principles. Finally,
there is the Expediency Council (majma-e tashkhis-e maslahat-e nazam),
which advises the Supreme Leader and makes final decisions in the case of a
disagreement between the parliament and the Council of Guardians. The
Expediency Council is interpreted by some as holding de facto power over the
other leading power authorities—except for the Supreme Leader. Although
the 1979 Constitution includes certain guarantees for improving the rights of
the political (soft) realm, the evidence of the degree of power held by
unaccountable parts of the state reveals the inner state’s rapid progress in
institutionalisation and consolidation, filling in gaps that the soft realm might
otherwise have occupied.

































On the other side of the political picture the soft realm is made up of the
apparent state—the president and the parliament—as well as of those groups
outside the state apparatus, such as student organisations, dissident clerics,
intellectuals and journalists, as well as opposition forces outside the country.
According to the constitution, the position of the presidency is second
in command to the Supreme Leader but in reality this depends on the
relationship between the two figures. If the president is seen as being in
opposition to the supreme leader, his position is weakened considerably.
Conclusion
This article has described the origins of a reform/security dilemma which, in
some parts of the world, may lead to a dual governance structure. Such
duality does not generally exist in Western nations, and is thus often ignored
or misinterpreted in the scholarly literature and policy formulations.
While the focus in this article has been on understandings of the ‘state’, the
analysis is very much affected by understandings of an equally complex
concept: security. It is ultimately differing understandings of security in the
developing world that contribute in some cases to the emergence of a dual
state structure. Much of the developing world remains located geopolitically
in anarchic regions, and continues to be unsettled and fragmented politically
at the domestic level. Consequently, security maintains a primary position,
and provides justification for power holders, be they armies (as in the Turkish
case), religious sects (the Iranian mullahs), or ideological party elites
(the secret service and President Putin in Russia), to try to maintain
unaccountable power centres to preserve their status. Their authority
becomes threatened by increasing global pressure for political liberalisation.
Since political change is often widely considered as potentially destabilising,
such power centres may become perceived and periodically utilised as a safety
net against tumultuous democratic transformations and may eventually
become embedded in the core segments of the state tradition in that country.
Once such a tradition exists, adding in the powerful force of global
liberalisation pressure may lead to a state–government duality. In contrast to
general Western perceptions, the inner states of such dualities may not simply
be power-grabbing authoritarians, but rather structures that have been
promoted by both the elite and societal desire for safe change. It is important
not to ignore the sociological and political origins of these authoritative state
formations, as they may help explain such apparent anomalies as societal
support for Iran’s mullahs, the popularity of President Putin, or the
continued ranking by Turkish society of the army as the country’s most
‘trusted’ institution.
What do we see when we look in detail at the Turkish and Iranian cases? In
the Iranian case the country remains within the understanding of security-
oriented state duality. Although there is abundant evidence of a pendulum
between security and reform, the overall trend has yet to shift significantly
towards a reform-based transformation. One might therefore conclude that


































government, and that, as long as the country’s real (or perceived) security
concerns remain strong, the dilemma will remain unresolved. The Turkish
case, however, provides some optimism that such a governance structure can
progress. Turkey is on the verge of moving beyond duality; becoming
something more closely reflecting Western ideas of the converged ‘state’, that
is, a state subordinated to a government—though one which will probably
always place a greater emphasis on security than is generally expected in
Western liberal democracies. The difference between the two cases seems to
lie in the nature of their inner states and their isolation or engagement with
the West. With its long history of contact with Western practices and ideas,
the Turkish inner state has become increasingly convinced of the inevitability
and need for political liberalisation. An inner state thus convinced may take
on new roles within this transformation period. As the provider of security,
Turkish inner state has seen its role become one of guarding the change
process itself. Inner states committed to change may no longer constitute
only obstacles to reform and progress, but may play a role in resolving the
reform/security dilemma.
In addition to pointing out the existence of a state–government duality, it
was also noted that, because of Western scholarship’s common combined
understanding of ‘state’ and ‘government’, subsequent analysis of states in
which the duality exists is likely to ignore or misinterpret its characteristics or
causes. Without recognising the dual state structure’s past and underlying
purposes, Western scholarship may label such political entities as unsuccess-
ful attempts to match a Western standard of the liberal democratic state. A
more in-depth look at the back-and-forth patterns of reform and security in
these states, and the gradual process of change that occurs within them,
indicates, however, that duality should not be superficially identified as
simply underdevelopment or failure to achieve an end. Rather, it should be
recognised as a natural reaction to deal with a reform/security dilemma in
countries where the stability of the transformation is the most important
problem facing the ruling elite. Even though duality appears authoritarian
and undemocratic, it can be better assessed if recognised as a reaction to the
need for safe transformation.
Unfortunately initial misinterpretations may further lead to flawed policy.
It is not possible to say that the West has produced effective formulas for
dealing with the dilemma of securing safe reform processes. Democratic aid
tends to concentrate solely on budding democratic entities and civil society,
which may provoke harsher reactions from inner state structures. The cases
of Iraq and Afghanistan point to the limitations of international intervention
to impose liberal reform in insecure environments. Recognising dual state
structures and their underlying security needs suggests the need at least to
consider working with those entities best positioned to help cope with
security problems.
Western policy scholars and practitioners may be better off if they stop
thinking that they have to carry the ‘burden’ of coming up with Western
policies to diagnose and treat problems of the non-Western world. The
‘illness’ of dual state political structures may very well be showing how such

































countries are producing their own solutions. If the Turkish case of duality
ends with relative success, then one could argue that non-Western political
products need not only present problems, but may also suggest solutions; in
this case, to the broad problem of safe political change.
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